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The Meaning of "Religion"
in the School Prayer Cases
The Supreme Court has read into the establishment clause of the
First Amendment a definition of the word "religion" which is proper
only to the free exercise clause of that amendment, the author asserts.
In employing this improper definition under the establishment clause
in the school prayer cases, the Court has tended to institutionalize
agnosticism as the official public religion.
by Charles E. Rice * Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law
IN THE CONTROVERSY over the
school prayer decisions, both sides have
virtually ignored the incongruity of the
Supreme Court's definition of reli-
gion. For, in fact, the Court has read
into the establishment clause of the
First Amendment a definition of the
word which is proper only to the
free exercise clause of that amend-
ment. The effect of this quiet muta-
tion is far-reaching indeed.
That part of the First Amendment
which deals with religion reads:
"Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof
* . .". The original meaning of the
first clause is clear. Said Judge
Thomas Cooley: "By establishment of
religion is meant the setting up or
recognition of a state church, or at
least the conferring upon one church
of special favors and advantages
which are denied to others."1  The
amendment was prompted by the cir-
cumstance that, in the words of James
Madison during the debate in Con-
gress over its adoption, "the people
feared one sect might obtain a pre.
eminence, or two combine together,
and establish a religion to which they
would compel others to conform."2 It
was the purpose of the establishment
clause, then, to prevent the prescrip-
tion by Congress of "a national faith",
that is, a nationally established official
church.'
It has been asserted, and incorrectly
so, that the establishment clause or-
dained a governmental abstention
from all matters of religion, a neu-
trality, as it were, between those who
believe in God and those who do not.
An examination of the history of the
clause, however, will not sustain that
analysis. Its end was neutrality, but
only of a sort. It commanded impar-
tiality on the part of government as
amnong the various sects of theistic
religions, that is, religions that pro-
fess a belief in God. But, as between
theistic religions and those nontheis-
tic creeds that do not acknowledge
God, the precept of neutrality under
the establishment clause did not ob-
tain. Government, conformably to the
establishment clause, could generate
an affirmative atmosphere of hospitality
toward theistic religion, so long as no
substantial partiality was shown toward
any particular theistic sect or combina-
tion of sects.
Historical Meaning
of the First Amendment
Justice Joseph Story, who served
on the Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845 and who was a leading Unitari-
an, confirmed the plain historical
meaning of the First Amendment:
Probably at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, and of the first
amendment to it ... the general if not
the universal sentiment in America. was,
that Christianity ought to receive en-
couragement from the state so far as
was not incompatible with the private
rights of conscience and the freedom of
religious worship. An attempt to level
all religions, and to make it a matter of
state policy to hold all in utter indiffer-
ence, would have created universal dis-
approbation, if not universal indigna-
tion.
1. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
224 (1898).
2. 1 ANNALS Or CONG. 731 (1789).
3. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 3, 11-12
(1949).
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The real object of the amendment
was not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism,
or infidelity, by prostrating Christian-
ity; but to exclude all rivalry among
Christian sects, and to prevent any
national ecclesiastical establishment
which should give to a hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national
government.
4
Logically, this means that for pur-
poses of the establishment clause non-
theistic beliefs were riot considered to
be religions. Otherwise, an affirmation
by government that there is a God
would be a governmental preference,
through the assertion of the essential
truth of theism, of a combination of
religious sects, i.e., those that believe
in God, to the disparagement of those
other religions which do not profess
such a belief. On the contrary, rather
than regarding theism and nontheism
as merely variant religious sects with-
in a broadly defined category of "re-
ligion". the establishment clause re-
garded theism as the common denom-
inator of all religions, and nontheism
it considered not to be a religion at all.
Government itself could profess a be-
lief in God, and, so long as a practical
neutrality was maintained among the-
istic sects, the neutrality command of
the establishment clause would not be
breached.
That it was not a purpose of the es-
tablishment clause to forbid such a
profession by government of the truth
of theism, or to forbid all official gov-
ernmental sanction of public prayer,
is shown by the fact that on September
24, 1789, the very same day that it
approved the First Amendment, Con-
gress called on the President to pro-
claim a national day of thanksgiving
and prayer, in the following resolution:
That a joint committee of both
Houses be directed to wait upon the
President of the United States to re-
quest that he would recommend to the
people of the United States a day of
public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging, with grate-
ful hearts, the many signal favors of
Almighty God, especially by affording
them an opportunity peaceably to es-
tablish a Constitution of government
for their safety and happiness.5
President Washington issued the
thanksgiving proclamation on October
3, 1789, and every President, except
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson,
has followed suit.
Would it not have been extraordi-
nary for Congress to request a public
day of prayer to be observed by "the
people of the United States" and on
the very same day to propose a con-
stitutional amendment to prohibit that
very type of prayer? Indeed, the spe-
cific religious issue was raised by Rep-
resentative Thomas Tucker of South
Carolina in the debate preceding the
adoption of the resolution. Mr. Tucker
objected that calling on the President
to proclaim a day of prayer "is a busi-
ness with which Congress have nothing
to do; it is a religious matter, and, as
such, is proscribed to us." 6 Congress,
however, passed the resolution.
If the question of Congress's compe-
tence in religious matters had not been
raised, it could possibly be said that it
had never occurred to the members
and therefore the action of Congress
ought not to be conclusive on the point.
When, however, the issue was squarely
joined, the First Congress deliberately
overrode the same objections we hear
so often today and voted to offer pub-
lic prayer to God.
Definitions of Religion
Are Given by the Court
The history and informed logic of
the establishment clause, therefore,
lead to the conclusion that its defini-
tion of religion was similar to that used
by Chief Justice Hughes in his dis-
senting opinion in a 1931 case involv-
ing the eligibility of a pacifist for
naturalization:
.. . The essence of religion is belief
in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any hu-
man relation .... One cannot speak
of religious liberty, with proper appre-
ciation of its essential and historic sig-
nificance, without assuming the exist-
ence of a belief in supreme allegiance
to the will of God.
7
For many years, it was assumed that
the same definition of religion applied
to the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, so that the clause, it could
be argued, protected only theistic be-
liefs against governmental prohibition.
Thus, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S.
333 at 342 (1890), the Supreme Court
said, "The term 'religion' has refer-
ence to one's views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will."
In the Davis case, the Court held that
the federal law prohibiting polygamy
was not an infringement upon the re-
ligious freedom of the defendant.
It is obvious, however, that believ-
ers in nontheistic creeds, such as athe-
ists and agnostics, should be protcctcd
in the free exercise of their religion as
fully as are Baptists and Presbyterians.
And it ought not to be inferred, from
the theistic definition of religion em-
ployed by the Court in the Davis case
that, if the issue were presented to it,
the Supreme Court would not have ac-
corded the protection of the free exer-
cise clause to atheists and agnostics
even at the time when the Court was
formulating its theistic definition of re-
ligion. The equity and reason of the
matter are plain. Moreover, as Mr.
Justice Brennan properly acknowl-
edged in his concurring opinion in the
Schempp case :
[O]ur religious composition makes us
a vastly more diverse people than were
our forefathers. They knew differences
chiefly among Protestant sects. Today
the Nation is far more heterogeneous
religiously, including as it does sub-
stantial minorities not only of Catholics
and Jews but as well of those who wor-
ship according to no version of the
Bible and those who worship no God at
all 8
It is correct beyond dispute that the
scttled protections of the free exercise
clause ought to be extended today to
such nontheistic creeds as atheism and
agnosticism. This conclusion, appar-
ently, determined the decision in Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961),
in which the Court invalidated a pro-
vision of the Constitution of Maryland
requiring a state employee to declare
his belief in God. The test, said Jus-
tice Black for the Court, unconstitu-
tionally invaded the employee's "free-
dom of belief and religion". The re-
4. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874 and 1877 (1891).
5. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 949 (1789).
6. 1 ANNALS Or CONG. 950 (1789).
7. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605,
633-634 (193t).
8. Abington Schoot District v. Schen pp, 374
U. S. 203, 240 (1963).
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quirement was invalid because "The
power and authority of the State of
Maryland thus is put on the side of one
particular sort of believers-those who
are willing to say they believe in 'the
existence of God'." The Court went on
to spell out the entitlement of nonthe-
istie beliefs to protection as religions:
We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Govern-
ment can constitutionally force a per-
son "to profess his belief or disbelief in
any religion." Neither can constitution-
ally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the exist.
ence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs.9 [Empha-
sis added.]
Appended to the last quoted clause
was a footnote specifying that: "Among
religions in this country which do not
teach what would commonly be consid-
ered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture,
Secular Humanism and others."
The Court's reliance on Mr. Tor-
caso's "freedom of belief and religion"
leaves some doubt as to whether the
decision rests on establishment clause
or free exercise clause grounds. How-
ever, it probably did rest on the latter,
and the decision is supportable in that
sense, because the free exercise clause
ought to interdict states Iassuming, as
the Court has held, that the First
Amendment is applied fully to the
states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment) from
barring nonbelievers in God from gen-
eral state employment.
Two Types of Religions
Are Now Protected
In view of the holding in Torcaso, it
may now be said that there are two
general types of religions entitled to
the protections of the First Amend-
ment.
On the one hand are those which
profess a belief in God. For purposes
of discussion, let us call them theistic,
and for analysis we shall include there-
in both deistic and theistic beliefs in
God with their variant interpretations
of the nature of God and His provi-
dence.
On the other hand are those non-
theistic religions described in Justice
Black's footnote in the Torcaso case.
Of the four nontheistic religions men-
tioned by him, the two most important
in contemporary terms are Ethical
Culture and Secular Humanism, which
are nontheistic in that they do not
affirm the existence of God. It is
reasonable also to include unorganized
atheism and agnosticism within the
Torcaso definition of nontheistic reli-
gion. While atheism flatly rejects a
belief in the existence of God, agnosti-
cism is: "The doctrine that neither the
existence nor the nature of God, nor
the ultimate origin of the universe, is
known or knowable . . .",j Atheism
and agnosticism are both compatible
with Ethical Culture and Secular Hu-
manism; they arc as much entitled to
constitutional treatment as religions as
are those latter beliefs.
The vice of the Torcaso case is that
the Court did not spell out the grounds
of the ruling and did not limit its new
and broader definition of religion to the
area of free exercise rather than that of
establishment. Regrettably, the Su-
preme Court has now taken its Toreaso
definition of religion and applied it
without apparent reservation to the es-
tablishment clause.
In the first of the school prayer de-
cisions,11 the Court did not cite any
cases in support of its determination.
The ruling seemed to rest on an as-
sumed incapacity of government, un-
der the First Amendment, to write or
sanction "official prayers" of any type,
at least in public schools. The Court
did not dwell on the reason for the in-
capacity, but it was intimated by Jus-
tice Black, speaking for the majority,
when he noted in passing: "When the
power, prestige and financial support
of government is placed behind a par-
ticular religious belief, the indirect co-
ercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing offi-
cially approved religion is plain" (em-
phasis added). What Justice Black
hinted at here was the same concept of
neutrality explicitly found controlling
one year later in the Schempp case.
There Justice Clark rested his opin-
ion for the Court on "the concept of
neutrality", which operates to prevent
a situation where the "official support
Charles E. Rice was educated at
Holy Cross (A.B. 1953), Boston
College (LL.B. 1956) and New
York University (LL.M. 1959,
J.S.D. 1962). In addition to
articles and reviews, he has
written two books, Freedom of
Association (1962) and The Su-
preme Court and Public Prayer:
The Need for Restraint (1964).
of the state or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of
one or of all orthodoxies". Engel and
Schempp, of course, were decided sole-
ly as establishment clause cases. And,
to emphasize the content of the neu-
trality which it now finds in the es-
tablishment clause, the majority opin-
ion in Schempp quoted in support an
extract from Torcaso explicitly adopt-
ing the broad definition of religion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can constitutionally force a
person "to profess a belief or disbe-
lief in any religion." Neither can con-
stitutionally pass laws or impose re-
quirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those
religions founded on different belieIs.
12
[Emphasis added.]
In view of the increased variety in
our religious composition, it is quite
proper for the Court to construe the
9. 367 U. S. at 495.
10. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED (Second Edition).
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
12. 374 U. S. at 220, citing from opinion of
Justice Black for the Court in Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 367 U. S. 488, 495 (1961).
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establishment clause to bar a law re-
specting a real "establishment", in the
limited historical sense of the word, of
either a theistic or nontheistic sect.
But the Court has gone much further
and is construing the clause, with its
newly incorporated definition of reli-
gion, in absolutist terms, affirming that
our "constitutional policy" denies, when
"religious training, teaching or observ-
ance" are concerned, "that the state
can undertake or sustain them in any
form or degree". 13
In his seventy-four page concurring
opinion in Schempp, Justice Brennan
probed the deeper meaning of the
Court's ruling and strained to demon-
strate that the decision was not a pre-
cursor of further extreme rulings. Yet
the best he could do on the words "un-
der God" in the pledge of allegiance
was to say that: "The reference to di-
vinity in the revised pledge of alle-
giance, for example, may merely rec-
ognize the historical fact that our Na-
tion was believed to have been founded
'under God'."
The pledge, in Justice Brennan's
view, is merely one of "the various
patriotic exercises and activities used
in the public schools and elsewhere
which, whatever may have been their
origins, no longer have a religious pur-
pose or meaning".' 4
Justice Brennan has supplied the
key the Court is likely to use to decide
if an exercise is "religious" or merely a
harmless "patriotic or ceremonial" one.
That is, if it is to be taken seriously,
it is therefore at least in part a "reli-
gious exercise", and as such it is pro-
hibited by the First Amendment. Only
if it is a mere affirmation of the histori-
cal fact that the founders believed in
the overlordship of God, or that some
Americans now so believe, and only if
it scrupulously avoids any affirmation
of the truth or falsity of that belief in
God, can the observance be insulated
from constitutional attack.
This rationale necessarily would pre-
vent an affirmation by a teacher or
other government official that, in fact,
the Declaration of Independence is
true when it asserts that men are en-
dowed "by their Creator" with un-
alienable rights or when it asserts the
existence of "the laws of nature and of
nature's God", a "Supreme Judge of
the world" and "Divine Providence".
In the nature of things, government-
al neutrality on the question of God's
existence is unattainable. A govern.
mental assertion that God does in fact
exist is a preferential affirmation of the
truth of theism; an assertion that God
does not exist is a preference of athe-
ism; and a perpetual suspension of
judgment by government on the ques-
tion is an adoption of the agnostic,
nontheistic position through the in-
plicit assertion that, as a matter of
state policy, the existence of God is
unknown or unknowable. In the school
prayer cases the Court appears to have
adopted an agnostic approach which is
incompatible, in its treatment of the
basic question of God's existence, with
the basic theistic affirmation which was
theretofore embedded in our law and
tradition.
It is not my purpose here to discuss
the possible extensions of the school
prayer decisions. Rather, I am con-
cerned only with the thought that the
unqualified incorporation of the broad
definition of religion into the estab-
blishment clause is perhaps the root
fallacy in the Court's reasoning. In
order to avoid an institutionalization
of agnosticism as the official public re-
ligion of this country, the Court
ought to acknowledge that nontheistic
religions are not entitled to such un-
qualified recognition under the estab-
lishment clause as to bar even a simple
governmental affirmation that in fact
the Declaration of Independence is
true when it states the existence of
God.
13. Abington School District v. Scherupp, 374
U. S. 203, 218 (1963), quoting from dissenting
opinion of Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson and Bnurton, in Everson v.
Board of Edvcation, 2.30 U. S. 1, 52 (1947).
14. Quotations from 374 U. S. 303, 304.
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